Matt Blaze: Wiretapping and Cryptography Today

in , , ,

Matt Blaze analyzes why the widespread use of cryptography has had almsost no impact on our practical ability to do wiretaps and gather information under legitimate court orders. Not too technical and absolutely worth a read.

Matt Blaze: Wiretapping and Cryptography Today:

Recent interview I gave on the need for anonymity in business

in , , ,

Revealing Secrets with a Click - Technology Review

This is a very nice interview that was just published by Technology Review on the importance of anonymity for businesses. This is a topic rarely covered. Generally either people are talking about anonymity for consumers, or businesses protecting or violating consumer privacy. Very little attention is paid to the legitimate needs of business to hide their identities on-line from time to time.

Big public email database with some interesting efforts at privacy launched this month

in ,

The press release linked at the bottom of this post is for a new website called AddressSearch.com. While I normally ignore most of the PR blasts sent to this blog, this one seemed worth posting because of the interesting realities and conflicts it exposes. The idea is that you can use their database to find and email people. Their database contains 68.8 million email addresses, a huge number but only a fraction of all US email addresses. Given that many such databases exist, it seems inevitable that someone would set up a service like this.

On the positive side, they are doing a few different things to try to minimize abuse. First, they are limiting users to 5 message per day (although it is not clear how that is enforced). Second, they provide some general address location information about all the name matches to make it more likely that you are going to email the correct person. Finally, they don't actually give you the recipients email address.

This last step is the most interesting. They allow you to write your email in a web form, then send it for you without revealing the recipients address to you. Of course it will be possible to abuse this, but probably not in any way that is not already widely possible. I also assume that this company keeps copies of the emails and adds your name and return address to their database. This is about protecting recipient privacy, not sender privacy.

On the whole, I am not happy that such services exist at all. I use social networking sites to make contact with me by strangers possible but only in the manner of my choosing. I don't want random people sending messages to my personal or work email addresses. Imagine a distributed attack by members of Anonymous or LulzSec all sending 5 emails each to some victim. Of course the odds are that any attacker would have little difficulty in discovering the victim's address through other means and then would not have any effective limit to the number of emails sent.

This may also turn out to be an unfortunate service for people who share a name with a celebrity. Interestingly, for people the service finds where it does not have an email address in the database, a paid ad refers you to Intelius.com where you can pay a couple of dollars to get the real address without any privacy features.

At the end of the day, the good news is that this company is making a significant effort to pay attention to the privacy implications of their service.

First-Ever Free Email Directory With Added Privacy Protection -- JACKSONVILLE, Fla., June 21, 2011 /PRNewswire/ --

 

The difficulty of identifying attackers on the Internet and why it is impossible to fix.

in , , , ,

This article in Scientific American does a nice job of describing why it is difficult to track attacks back to their true origins. This essay by Bruce Schneier goes farther arguing that it is fundamentally impossible to create an Internet without anonymity.

The core point of both articles is that identifying the computer that a given packet came from is not the same as identifying the sender. The computer could be a server set up to enable anonymous communications (like Anonymizer.com), it could be a compromised computer (like part of a botnet), or even a server run by the attacker purchased using pre-paid or stolen credit cards.

Whatever the mechanism, it will always be possible for attackers to hide their identities and activities. The real question is the degree to which we are willing to design the Internet to make tracking and monitoring of citizens easy for repressive regimes.

Facebook automatically tagging your face in pictures

in , , , , ,

Face book announced that it will soon start automatically suggesting your name for tagging photos any time it thinks it recognizes you in a picture. This automatic facial recognition is the default and will be done unless you explicitly opt out.

It looks like you need to customize your privacy settings to disable this. In Facebook, look under the "account" menu and select "Privacy Settings".

From there click the "Customize settings" link at the bottom of the table. Within there, look for "Suggest photos of me to friends", and set it to "Disabled".

I suspect that few people will simply stumble on that.

Other people tagging you in photos can lead to embarrassment you might want to avoid. Having your name suggested just makes that more likely.

While you are at it, you might want to change the setting that allows others to "check you in" to locations. That can tell thieves you are away from home or stalkers where to find you.

CNN has a good article on the announcement. Facebook lets users opt out of facial recognition - CNN.com

 

A Very Nice Analysis of the Lockheed Martin Network Breach

in , ,

Here is a really nice analysis of the recent security breach at Lockheed Martin. The short version is that is looks like their SecureID tokens got duplicated. This is almost certainly related to the security breach at EMC / RSA. Digital Dao: An Open Source Analysis Of The Lockheed Martin Network Breach

Using Language Patterns to Pierce Anonymity

in , , , , , ,

Thanks to Bruce Schneier for linking to this interesting article on using patterns in language to identify the author of emails. While the technique would not allow them to identify your anonymous emails in an ocean of others, that is rarely the real world threat scenario.

In many cases there is a relative hand full of likely authors of a given email or group of emails. It is often possible to gather large samples of emails known and acknowledged to be from the likely authors. In that case this technique has a small group of targets and excellent training materials which allow for very high levels of accuracy (the authors of the paper claim 80% - 90%). That is probably enough to get a warrant to search your home and computers.

Unless you have been unusually careful, the gig is probably up by then. Remember, this might not be for criminal matters. It many cases this would come up in whistle blowing or other non-criminal situations.

Amazing power and danger of data retention

in , , , , , ,

This Blog has an interesting article and link to the website of a german newspaper article (translated here).

The story is about a german politician Malte Spitz who sued to obtain the retained cell tower records for his own phone, then provided them to the newspaper. The newspaper has created a nice map and timeline tool to allow you to play Spitz's movements over 6 months. The resolution is impressive and should be a real wake up call about the level of detailed information being gathered on us all.

Of course, if the phone company was capturing GPS or WiFi based location information the data would be much more accurate. While GPS would quickly drain the battery, many modern phones have WiFi enabled all the time, so that information would be readily available without any additional impact on the phone's performance.

Debate about activist need for anonymity on Facebook

in , , , , , ,

Amid unrest, a hard new look at online anonymity | The Social - CNET News:

This article takes an interesting look at the issues with Facebook's true name policy and the impact it has on activists and dissidents in repressive countries. It quite rightly talks about the fact that for most of the history of the Internet use of "screen names" was the default.

The odd thing about this debate is that there is basically no authentication of the names used. Many people assume that since most users are under true name that all of them are. It is trivial to set up a new account with a plausible name which can not be traced back to the real user.

I would hope that dissidents, activists and others at risk would take advantage of this simple capability to protect themselves. Yes, this is in violation of the terms of service, but I think it is for a much greater good.

If you choose to do this, take care with who you friend under this alias. If the social network you create matches your real one, or that of another account, it may be very easy to unmask your identity.

Specter of Mandatory Data Retention

in

In this CNET article by Declan McCulagh, he reports that the DoJ is planning to request mandatory data retention by Internet providers. Their argument is that the lack of data retention is interfering with law enforcement's ability to investigate cases. This implies some kind of shift in the balance of privacy vs. access. No such shift has taken place.

I think that they are more frustrated by the fact that a huge potential gold mine of information is out there to which they don't have access. Prior to the various modern technological revolutions people used pay phones, sent letters, and paid cash for toll roads.

Now they use Twitter, SMS, Facebook, Email, cell phones, electronic toll payment etc. There is way more information available to law enforcement now than before. The fact that this data retention is only on the Internet may make people feel better, but one would certainly learn more about me from my Internet activities than from following me around physically.

Lets look at what is being asked for with a real world analogy. This is like saying that the US Postal Service should photograph and database the address, and return address, on every letter which goes through the system. Physically is it like saying the cell phone company should record and retain my GPS location at all times. Either of those would actually be much less intrusive than monitoring how I use the Internet at all times.

Lets not get in to the cost of maintaining these records or the issues with leaks or hackers. Consider the Chinese attacks on dissident Google accounts. This plan would ensure that such information was much more widely maintained.

At this point it appears to be a only a request. I am curious to see how this evolves over the congressional term.

Reader question on privacy software

in , , , , , , , ,

A reader of this blog recently emailed me to ask:

What s/w do you recommend to keep anonymous while using Gmail, IE, Outlook, and Facebook on a laptop?

This is actually a very tricky question because the nature of all of these tools, except Internet Explorer (IE), is to be associated with a visible and discoverable account and identity in the "cloud". I will discuss IE last and separately.

Gmail ties to your gmail and other Google accounts. Outlook ties to some existing email account at some email provider. Facebook is tied to your Facebook account and is explicitly designed for making your information public.

The profound question here is, what do we even mean by being anonymous using these services? I would argue that the best one can manage is to be pseudonymous; that is to maintain a persistent and visible pseudonym / alias which, while discoverable, is not associated with your true identity.

Fortunately Gmail and Facebook are free and typically do not require any real credentials to set up an account, and many of the free email providers work similarly. Using Anonymizer Universal (AU), and a browser with no history or cache to set up the accounts would ensure they were not connected to your real identity. It is important that the accounts never be accessed in any way except through AU, or they will be forever after associated with your real IP address. Furthermore, it is critical that the browser used is never used for any activity connected to your real identity, or the cookies and other digital detritus in your browser may allow these sites (or other folks) to tie the pseudonym to your other real name accounts.

IE is in many ways the easiest because there is no underlying account, but all the same rules apply. You need to ensure that you isolate your anonymous or pseudonymous activity from your real name activity.

For all of this activity a virtual machine can be a very effective tool. For example, if you use a Mac you can use a virtual machine running Windows or Linux for all of your alias activities and use the normal operating system for your real name activities. Similar tools exist for other operating systems.

Anonymizer Nevercookie tool is now available

in , , ,

I am very excited that we have finally released our new free "Anonymizer Nevercookie" product. You can download it here from our facebook account. It enhances the private browsing mode in Firefox to protect against a whole range of new kinds of tracking cookies that currently are nearly impossible to delete.