The Hola peer to peer VPN service suffered a number of very damaging security revelations today including exploit vulnerabilities, exposed administrative tools, & broken architecture impacting 45 million active users of the service.Read More
FBI Director James Cormey says that the North Korean’s who hacked Sony were tracked because of bad operational security in their use of proxies.
We saw the same thing with the take down of the Silk Road website. Few people have the skills, tools, and discipline to be 100% consistent with their anonymity. Any slip at any time can blow your cover. Of course, this could have been an intentional false flag, the rabbit hole can get very deep. Jeff Carr makes the case that this is actually quite likely.
"FBI Director James Comey, today, said that the hackers who compromised Sony Pictures Entertainment usually used proxy servers to obfuscate their identity, but "several times they got sloppy."
Speaking today at an event at Fordham University in New York, Comey said, "Several times, either because they forgot or because of a technical problem, they connected directly and we could see that the IPs they were using ... were exclusively used by the North Koreans."
It looks like people who care about Internet anonymity need to look outside Canada for their providers. It is not just a concern that the Canadian government would be able to subpoena the information, but it is also vulnerable to insider and external attack. If the data exists, it will eventually leak.
Starting today Canadian Internet providers are required to forward copyright infringement notices to their subscribers. This notification scheme provides a safe harbor for ISPs but is also expected to result in a surge in piracy settlement schemes. The new law further causes trouble for VPN providers, who are now required to log customers for at least six months.
I have long said that privacy services are all about trust. I this article demonstrating how to use a simple web proxy to compromise the users of that proxy. Of course, the operator of the proxy is being untrustworthy, but that is the whole point. If you don’t have a reason to specifically trust the operator of your privacy service, you need to assume that they are attempting to do you harm. Of course, the same argument applies to Tor. Literally anyone could be running that proxy for any purpose.
Everything is done via a stock SQUID proxy with small config changes.
The idea is pretty simple:
- [Server] Install Squid on a linux server
- [Cache] Set the caching time of the modified .js files as high as possible
In a brilliant campaign, IO9 and the EFF is having cosplayers pose with pro-anonymity, pro-privacy, and pro-pseudonymity signs. See the whole set here. The most popular seems to be “I have a right to a Secret Identity!”.
It turns out that people say nasty things under their real names, and people also say valuable things anonymously.
It is amazing how often I see respected academics and other thinkers get incredibly sloppy in their reasoning when it comes to anonymity. They frequently assume correlations for which they have no evidence, and propose solutions with no consideration of the consequences.
I appreciate the rational perspective in articles like this.
This article describes a clever attack against Secret, the “anonymous” secret sharing app.
Their technique allows the attacker to isolate just a single target, so any posts seen are known to be from them. The company is working on detecting and preventing this attack, but it is a hard problem.
In general, any anonymity system needs to blend the activity of a number of users so that any observed activity could have originated from any of them. For effective anonymity the number needs to be large. Just pulling from the friends in my address book who also use Secret is way too small a group.
A Brazilian court is enforcing a constitutional ban on anonymity by requiring Apple and Google to remove Secret, an anonymous social network chatting app from their app stores. Microsoft is being required to remove Cryptic, a similar windows phone app. In addition to that, they have been ordered to remove the app from the phones of all users who have installed it. These kinds of retroactive orders to have companies intrusively modify the contents of all of their customer’s devices are concerning. At least these apps are free, if users had paid for them, that would introduce another complication.
One wonders how this will apply to tourists or business travelers visiting Brazil. Will their phones be impacted as well?
The law exists to allow victims of libel or slander to identify and confront their those speakers.
While this ruling only applies to Apple, Google, and Microsoft, and only with respect to the Secret and Cryptic apps, the underlying principle extends much further. There are still final rulings to come, so this is not the last word on this situation.
Anonymizer has had a great many Brazilian customers for many years. Anonymizer provides those users important protections which are well established in international human rights law. We certainly hope that they will continue to be allowed to use our services.
Tor just announced that they have detected and blocked an attack that may have allowed hidden services and possibly users to be de-anonymized.
It looks like this may be connected to the recently canceled BlackHat talk on Tor vulnerabilities. One hopes so, otherwise the attack may have been more hostile than simple research.
Tor is releasing updated server and client code to patch the vulnerability used in this attack. This shows once again one of the key architectural weaknesses in Tor, the distributed volunteer infrastructure. On the one hand, it means that you are not putting all of your trust in one entity. On the other hand, you really don’t know who you are trusting, and anyone could be running the nodes you are using. Many groups hostile to your interests would have good reason to run Tor nodes and to try to break your anonymity.
The announcement from Tor is linked below.
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs recently announced a contest to create a method to identify Tor users, with a prize of about $114,000.
Clearly the government is worried about the ability of Tor to allow people to bypass the increasingly draconian Internet laws that have been put in place. This puts a big target on Tor, but people have been working on breaking Tor for years. This year a talk at Black Hat on cracking Tor anonymity was pulled without explanation after it was announced and scheduled.
Being free and well established, Tor has the largest user base of any privacy service, so it is the obvious first target. Its distributed design also introduces paths for attack not available in other designs like Anonymizer Universal.
It will be interesting to see if this move drives Tor users to other services, and whether that in turn leads to expanded efforts to crack those tools.
The Importance of Privacy & The Power of Anonymizers: A Talk With Lance Cottrell From Ntrepid — The Social Network Station A recent interview I did, talking about data anonymization and mobile device privacy. Lance Cottrell is the Founder and Chief Scientist of Anonymizer. Follow me on Facebook, Twitter, and Google+.
One often hears that some massive collection of data will not have privacy implications because it has been “anonymized”. Any time you hear that, treat the statement with great skepticism. It turns out that effectively anonymizing data, making it impossible to identify the individuals in the data set, is much harder than you might think. The reason comes down to combinatorics and structured information.
This article on Medium by Vijay Pandurangan discusses a massive data set of NYC taxies, complete with medallion number, license number, time and location of every pick up and drop off, and more. The key to unraveling it is that there are just not that many taxi medallions, and the numbering structure only allows for a manageable possible number of combinations (under 24 million). While that would be a lot to work through by hand, Vijay was able to hash and identify every single one in the database in under 2 minutes.
Another approach would have been to make a set of known trips, note the location, time, etc., then use that to map the hash to the true identity. More work but very straight forward.
Even harder is the problem of combinatorics when applied to “non-identifying” data. One will often see birth date (or partial birth date) zip code, gender, age, and the like treated as non-identifying. Just five digit Zip-code, date of birth, and gender will uniquely identify people 63% of the time.
A study of cell phone location data showed that just 4 location references was enough to uniquely identify individuals.
This is a great resource on all kinds of de-anonymization.
The reality is that, once enough is collected is is almost certainly identifiable. Aggregation provides the best anonymization, where individual records represent large groups of people rather than individuals.
Update: small edit for clarification of my statement about aggregation.
Canada’s Supreme Court just released a ruling providing some protection for on-line anonymity. Specifically, the ruling requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before going to an Internet provider to obtain the identity of a user. Previously they were free to simply approach the provider and ask (but not compel) the information.
The judges found that there is a significant expectation of privacy with respect to the identifying information, and that anonymity is a foundation of that right.
Unfortunately the case in question revolves around child pornography, which creates a great deal of passion. Much of the reaction against the decision has come from those working to protect abused children. Because the ruling has implications primarily far from child porn cases, I applaud the court in taking the larger and longer view of the principle at work.
It is important to remember that the court is not saying that the information can not be obtained. This is not an absolute protection of anonymity. This decision simply requires a warrant for the information, ensuring that there is at least probable cause before penetrating the veil of anonymity.
Paying for anonymity is a tricky thing, mostly because on-line payments are strikingly non-anonymous. The default payment mechanism on the Internet is the Credit Card, which generally requires hard identification. There are anonymous pre-paid cards, but they are getting harder to find, and most pre-paid cards are requiring registration with real name and (in the US) social security number.
We are working on supporting Bitcoin which provides some anonymity, but not as much as you might think. New tools for Bitcoin anonymity are being developed, so this situation may improve, and other crypto currencies are gaining traction as well.
When it comes to anonymity, cash is still king. Random small US bills are truly anonymous, and widely available (1996 study showed over half of all physical US currency circulates outside the country). While non-anonymous payments only allow Anonymizer to know who its customers are, not what they are doing, that information might be sensitive and important to protect for some people.
That is why Anonymizer accepts cash payments for its services. Obviously it is slower and more cumbersome, but for those who need it, we feel it is important to provide the ultimate anonymous payment option. If you are looking at a privacy provider, even if you don’t plan to pay with cash, take a look at whether it is an option. It could tell you something about how seriously they take protecting your privacy overall.
Here is more evidence that, if a service has access to your information, that it can get out. In this case the privacy services Whisper and Secret have privacy policies that say they will release messages tied to your identity if presented with a court order, but also to enforce their terms of service and even in response to a simple claim of “wrongdoing” (whatever that might mean).
Anonymizer has no logs connecting user activity to user identity, thus we don’t have these problems.